Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

Leo I. Tannehill v. Lewis N. Terry : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black; Counsel for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tannehill v. Terry, No. 9154 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3511

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Case No. 9154

In the Supreme Court
of the
State of Utah

F' LEI
11

~

f1

! _.1

1 , 0 60··
•.

1..)

LEO I. TANNEHILL,
Plazntiff and Appellant,

-vs.LEWIS N. TERRY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

RAWLINGS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ---------------------------··········-·······-------

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................

2

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON ............................

3

ARGUMENT ------·-····-···--·-----------------------------------------------------------------

4

POINT I. THE TRIAL COUR'T ERRED IN SUBMITTING ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY.............

4

POINT II. THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF
RISK WAS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE
LAW ON SAID SUBJECT.---------------------------------------------------- 10
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------········-----------------------········--·- 13
AUTHORI'TIES CITED
CASES
Brady v. Kane (Fla.), 111 So. 2d 472............................................

8

Clay v. Dunford, 120 Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075..........................

6

Garcia v. San Gabriel Ready Mix, 155 Cal App. 2d 568, 318
P. 2d 145 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12
Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P. 2d 884 .................... 6, 11
Kleppe v. Prawl, 181 Kan. 590, 313 P. 2d 227, 63 A.L.R.
2d 175 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7

Rogers v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45' Cal. 2d 414, 289
P. 2d 226 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12
TEXTS
2 Harper & James, the Law of Torts, § 21.1 p. 1162....................

4

2 Harper & James, the Law of Torts, § 21.8, p. 1191................

9

2 Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 466------------------------------------

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the
State of Utah
LEO I. TANNEHILL,
Plat'ntiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 9154

LEWIS N. TERRY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

(The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in the trial court.)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment upon
a verdict of No Cause of Action (R. 62). This action
was for personal injuries alleged to have resulted when
plaintiff was hit in the head with a golf club negligently
swung by defendant.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff visited defendant at the latter's home in
Ogden on Sunday afterno?n, May 4, 1958 at approximately 3 :30 or 4:00 o'clock. Defendant had just bought a
set of golf clubs and had been taking golf lessons (R. 5).
Defendant suggested they go to the back of his place and
knock a few balls. Defendant had some small, plastic
practice balls (R. 5). The defendant's house faced the
north and the two went out the south, or back, door on to
a platform and then down some steps to a sidewalk which
ran east and west. To the south of this sidewalk was
grass. Defendant placed a cocoa mat on the grass, placed
a ball on it and hit it to the east, or to his left (Tr. 7).
Defendant then placed another ball on the mat for plaintiff to hit (Tr. 7). As plaintiff grasped the club defendant told him he was not holding it correctly. He then
came over and took the club from plaintiff and defendant
proceeded to show plaintiff how to hold the club and
position his body (Tr. 8).
The foregoing facts are not in dispute. At this point
a dispute arises between the parties. According to defendant, he stated: "Leo, (plaintiff), will you get out of
the way, I am going to hit the ball" (Tr. 44). Plaintiff
denied that any such warning was given him. He testified
that defendant told him to stand off to the left and told
him to watch the position of his body and the angle of
the club. Plaintiff testified that that is when he was hit
(Tr. 8).
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Again the parties are in agreement as to what occurred thereafter.
Defendant testified that after he had addressed the
ball it took him smne ti1ne to get in proper position to
hit it. He testified "I had been told to keep my head
down, I assumed Leo was out of the road because I told
him to get out of the road, and I swung and hit him"
('Tr. 44). Defendant stated that he did not look to see
whether plaintiff actually got out of the way (Tr. 51).
He admitted that he did not know where plaintiff was at
the tin1e he swung (Tr. 52). Plaintiff was hit on the
follow through part of the swing.
Plaintiff fell back on the steps and the next thing
he knew someone had raised him up. l-Ie was sitting on
the sidewalk and blood was coming from his head (Tr. 8).
He was given a towel to absorb the flow of blood and was
taken to a hospital. The outer table of bone of the front
sinus immediately to the left of the nose, was broken
through. He also received a subluxated coccyx when he
fell against the steps.
The case was submitted to a jury and the jury returned a verdict of No Cause of Action (R. 56). Plaintiff contends the trial court committed error in its instructions to the jury.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
POINT II.
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS
AN INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW ON SAID
SUBJECT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY.

The trial court by its Instruction No.8 (R. 19), submitted the issue of assumption of risk to the jury. It is
the contention of plaintiff that this issue should not have
been submitted to the jury in a case with the factual situation presented here. The only defense involved here
was that of contributory negligence.
Under the facts of this case defendant was under a
continuing obligation to be careful in connection with his
swinging of the club. This duty was present right up
until the time plaintiff was struck. This is not a situation
where defendant had no duty toward the plaintiff after he
had given his so-called warning. He admitted that he
addressed the ball for some space of time and that he did
not know where plaintiff was, nor even look to see where
he was at the time he swung his club. There is no evidence
that the plaintiff consented to this type of conduct or
danger.
In 2 Harper & James, tlzc Law of Torts, §21.1, p.
1162, the authorities speak of the two distinct types of
so-called assumption of risk:
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"(1) In its primary sense the plaintiff's
assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of
the defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk. In such a case plaintiff may
not recover for his injury even though he was
quite reasonable in encountering the risk that
caused it. Volenti non fit injuria. (2) A plaintiff
may also be said to assume a risk created by defendant's breach of duty towards him, when he
deliberately chooses to encounter that risk. In
such a case, except possibly in master and servant
cases, plaintiff will be barred from recovery only
if he was unreasonable in encountering the risk
under the circumstances. This is a form of contributory negligence. Hereafter we shall call this
'assumption of risk in a secondary sense.' "
We submit that the only real defense of assumption
of risk is the first type, that the second type is, and can
only be, contributory negligence. Our contention on this
is confirmed by the Restatement of the Law of Torts.
There is no distinct defense of assumption of risk therein
treated. The only place assumption of risk is considered
is under the heading of contributory negligence. See 2
Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 466. In order for
there to be contributory negligence there must not only
be an intentional exposure to danger created by defendant's negligence, but, also, that exposure must be unreasonable. This latter element is not set forth in the
court's instruction on assumption of risk.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in two
comparatively recent cases, has rejected the defense of
assumption of risk as applicable to the cases being conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sidered. Clay v. Dunford, 120 Utah 177, 239 P. 2d 1075
(1952); Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P. 2d
884 (1959). In discussing the elements of this defense
this court, in the Clay case, stated:
"The texts referred to by defendant in support of its position that the deceased assumed the
risk, do not seem to bear out such position. They
say that 'The doctrine of assumption of risk in an
action between persons not master and servant,
or not having relations by contract with each
other, is confined to cases where the plaintiff not
only knew and appreciated the danger, but voluntarily put himself in the way of it,' and that 'The
essential elements of assumed risk are knowledge,
actual or implied, by the plaintiff of a specifiJc
defect or dangerous condition caused by the negligence of the defendant in the violation of some
duty owing to the plaintiff, * * * together with
the plaintiff's appreciation of the danger to be
encountered and his voluntary exposure of himself
to it.' They also clearly set forth the distinctions
between the doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence.
"The uncontroverted evidence showed that
at the time of the accident the deceased was standing on the shoulder of the highway where vehicles
ordinarily do not travel, with his back turned to
the oncoming truck, completely negativing knowledge or appreciation of the specific danger, and
negativing any intention voluntarily to expose
himself to a known danger, - elements which
must be established before the defense of assumption of risk is applicable."
In the Johnson case this court stated concerning
assumption of risk:
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"·The fundamental consideration underlying
it is that one should not be permitted to knowingly and voluntarily incur an obvious risk of personal harm when he has the ability to avoid doing
so, and then hold another responsible for his injury. Its essential elements are: knowledge of a
danger and a free and voluntary consent to assume it.
"Under any reasonable view of the evidence
here the conduct of the plaintiff would not fall
within the requisites of the doctrine of assumption
of risk. This was the type of hazard which would
exist at practically every intersection where there
is much traffic. It is not shown that plaintiff was
aware of the particular danger involved in the
approach of the defendant's car, nor that having
such knowledge, she nevertheless assumed the risk
of such danger and proceeded. The true issue of
fact to be determined as to her conduct was the
usual one: did she use the care which an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would have
done under the circumstances. That is, was she
guilty of contributory negligence."
Some authorities make the distinction that contributory negligence is carelessness and assumption of risk
is venturousness. There certainly is nothing venturous
about the plaintiff's conduct in this case. It was a question of whether or not he exercised ordinary care for his
own safety at the time he was hit. In distinguishing between these two defenses, the court, in Kleppe v. Prawl,
181 Kan. 590, 313 P. 2d 227, 63 A.L.R. 2d 175, stated as
follows:
"While assumption of risk is somewhat akin
to contributory negligence, these two doctrines
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of law are not synonymous because assumption of
risk arises through implied contract of assuming
the risk of a known danger ; the essence of it is
venturousness; it implies intentional exposure to
a known danger; it embraces a mental state of
willingness; it pertains to the preliminary conduct
of getting into a dangerous employment or relation; it means voluntarily incurring the risk of an
accident, which may not occur, and which the
person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid;
it defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an accident
occurs. Contributory negligence arises out of a
tort; the essence of it is carelessness; it may or
may not imply intentional exposure to a known
danger; it is a matter of conduct; a contributorily
negligent act leads more immediately to a specific
accident.
"Another difference is that assumption of
risk denies defendant's negligence while contributory negligence admits defendant's negligence but
denies it is the proximate cause of the accident.
65 CJS Negligence § 117, pp 709-11; 38 Am. Jur.,
Negligence, § 172, p. 847."
A case very similar to the one at bar is Brady v.
Kane (Fla.), 111 So. 2d 472 (1959). In that case plaintiff
was hit in the head ·with a golf club. In rejecting the defense of assumption of risk, the court stated:
"Appellee contended that appellant assumed
the risk of the injury which occurred. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the
party moved against, that defense was not applicable on the facts as they stood at the close of
the plaintiff's case. Therefore, at the least, the
question was one for the jury. 'Voluntary exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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posure is the bedrock upon which the doctrine of
assumed risk rests. Appreciation of the danger
is an essential to the defense of assumption of
risk * *.' Bartholf v. Baker, Fla., 1954, 71 So. 2d
480, 483. A member of a golfing foursome assumes certain obvious and ordinary risks of the
sport by participating therein with knowledge of
its normal dangers, but a player does not assume
a risk which cannot reasonably be anticipated, and
which may be the result of improper and unauthorized negligent action of another player."
The defense of assumption of risk is really a misnomer. What it amounts to is either relieving the defendant of a duty of ordinary care toward plaintiff, or it
is a failure on the part of the plaintiff to take reasonable care for his own safety. In speaking of this defense,
it is stated in 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts,
§ 21.8, p. 1191 :
"The doctrine of assumption of risk, however
it is analyzed and defined, is in most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine which restricts liability and so cuts down the compensation of accident victims. It is a heritage of the extreme individualism of the early industrial revolution. But
quite aside from any questions of policy or of
substance, the concept of assuming the risk is
purely duplicative of other more widely understood concepts, such as scope of duty or contributory negligence. The one exception is to be found
perhaps, in those cases where there is an actual
agreement. Moreover, the expression has come
to stand for two or three distinct notions which
are not at all the same, though they often overlap
in the sense that they are applicable to the same
situation.
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"Except for express assumption of risk,
therefore, the term and the concept should be
abolished. It adds nothing to modern law except
confusion. For the most part the policy of individualism it represents is outmoded in accident
law; where it is not, that policy can find full
scope and far better expression in other language.
There is only one thing that can be said for assumption of risk. In the confusion it introduces,
it sometimes- ironically and quite capriciouslyleads to a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some
other field. The aura of disfavor that has come
to surround it may occasionally turn out to be
the kiss of death to some other bad rule with which
it has become associated. We have seen how this
may happen with the burden of pleading and
proving an exceptional limitation on the scope of
defendant's duty. There may be other instances.
But at best this sort of thing is a poor excuse indeed for continuing the confusion of an unfortunate form of words."
It is submitted that the giving of this instruction was
error and that it could only lead to confusion and mislead
the jury. This doctrine had no proper place in the case.
POINT II.
THE INSTRUCTION ON ASSUMPTION OF RISK WAS
AN INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW ON SAID
SUBJECT.

Even if it were conceded that assun1ption of risk
was properly an issue in the case, the court committed
manifest error in the instruction itself. It did not limit
this so-called defense to the proposition that plaintiff
must know and appreciate the danger. The court perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mitted this defense to exist in the event that plaintiff
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have
known that a danger existed in the conduct of defendant.
The trial court's Instruction No. 8 (R. 19) embodies this
defense, which is defendant's requested Instruction No.
14 (R. 43). The defendant invited this manifest error.
The court instructed the jury:
"'Instruction No. 8
"There is a legal phrase commonly referred
to be the term 'assumption of risk' which is as
follows:
"One is said to assume a risk when he voluntarily assents to dangerous conduct and voluntarily exposes himself to that danger, or when
he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should know, that a danger exists in the conduct
of another, and voluntarily places himself, or
remains, in a position of danger. One who has
thus assumed the risk is not entitled to recover
for damage caused to him without intention,
and which results from the dangerous condition
or conduct to which he thus exposed himself."
(Italics ours)
If there is anything clear in the law of assumption
of risk it is that plaintiff must know and ,appreciate the
danger involved. An instruction almost exactly the same
as this was held prejudicial error in Johnson v. Maynard,
9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P. 2d 884. In speaking of the instruCtion in that case the court stated :
"It is further to be observed that the court
did not correctly instruct the jury on assumption
of risk had it been applicable. In the first portion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of Instruction No. 7 he correctly imposed the requirement that, 'she freely, voluntarily and knowingly manifest * * * her assent to dangerous conduct * * *.' but later in the same instruction explained that it would be applicable if the plaintiff
knows, '* * * or in the exercise of ordinary care
would know, that danger exists * * *.' The latter
statement is in error because it would permit a
finding of assumption of risk, exonerating the
defendant from liability, without actual knovdedge
of such danger on the part of the plaintiff."
In Rogers v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 45 Cal. 2d
414, 289 P. 2d 226 (1955), it was held that the trial court
properly refused to give a request similar to that made
by defendant and given in this case. The court stated:
"Transit Lines and Feb claim error in the
refusal to give their offered instruction on assumption of risk. Suffice it to say the offered
instruction was erroneous in that it advised the
jury that plaintiff would assume the risk if in the
exercise of ordinary care he would have known
and appreciated the danger rather than that he
must have knowledge of the danger."
In Garcia v. San Gabriel Ready Mix, 155 Cal. App.
2d 568, 318 P. 2d 145 (1957) the court pointed out how
important this matter of knowledge is. It there stated:
'• However many instructions on assumption
of the risk may be given, and however they n1ay be
worded, one essential is that the jury be told
that a person must know what risk he assumes."
We submit that this instruction was completely erroneous in permitting assumption of risk to be found
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under circumstances where plaintiff in the exercise of
ordinary care, should have known that a danger existed.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the trial court not only committed
error in permitting a jury to pass upon the defense of
assumption of risk, but also committed error in its definition of this defense. We submit that the verdict in favor
of defendant "No Cause of Action" should be reversed
and plaintiff granted a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE
ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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